The CEEC Adventure – socially constructed or realistically determent
Introduction
When the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 90’s, the western states
needed to find a place for the ex-soviet states with in the world
order. The integration of the CEE states and the sheer willingness of
both parties to unite can in my view be explained through a
social constructivist approach
but also through a rational one, even to the extent of
liberal intergovernmentalism. Two
compelling arguments can be made to justify either view:
# Rational argument ###
Armed conflict had broken out between national groups within the
region and the risk of ethnic tension spiralling out of control was
considered high. The EU and NATO could not just stand by as the
situation either calmed down or escalated. Given that the prime
concern was to ensure the power balance within Europe, and to secure
further development of the capitalized world, the integration of the
CEE countries was considered necessary.
# Socially constructive argument ###
Most of the CEE states did openly express their eagerness to rejoin
Europe as soon as the iron curtain fell and in that light the European
Council announced ‘that the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European
Union.’ (Nugent, 2010, p. 42). The announcement was followed by a list
of conditions, the Copenhagen criteria, which the CEEC’s had to meet,
but the spirit of the announcement suggests a European identity of
share values and norms and thus a social constructive explanation.
In order to determine which one of these arguments give a more
accurate picture of the CEEC integration we need to examine more
closely the actions and decisions made by both parties, leading to,
and during the accession negotiations. By examining the rule transfer
process I believe I can decipher if the CEEC integration was driven by
security issues or by a shared European identity. In that regard I
base my analysis on Frank Schimmelfennig’s and Ulrich Sedelmeier’s
2004 article Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Will Kymlicka’s
analysis of the CEEC/EU relations in Multicultural Odysseys –
Navigating the new International Politics of Diversity 2007.
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier analyze the case through a ‘governance
approach’ and look specifically at how those rules and norms where
transferred. Although ‘government approaches’ are generally used for
‘policy network analysis’ within the EU, Schimmelfenning and
Sedelmeier claim that it serves a useful tool for external relations
analysis as well (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 1). To look
more closely at the issue of national minorities Kymlicka’s analysis
offers a vital insight of the case, for he believes that in order to
fully secure democracy as a just international norm; we must first and
foremost secure the rights and autonomy of national minority
groups. Only then can we create a normative foundation for developing
human rights, without which democracy is nothing but an illusion
(Kymlicka, 2001, p. 69). Whether or not the EU offered membership to
the CEEC based on self-interests or not can by determined from
Kymlicka’s analysis.
Approaching governance
The Copenhagen criteria
included various issues of reforms, including minority rights in the
region. From the liberal multiculturalist point of view the CEEC
integration process offered an opportunity to address humanitarian
issues regarding the mistreatment of national minorities in the
post-communist states. The EU did without a doubt manage to diffuse
humanitarian norms from the west, to the east, but it’s been a matter
of some debate if the method and the norms themselves did to any
extent offer a permanent solution.
The integration process was time-consuming and involved hard
negotiations as the pending member states where expected to meet the
demanding conditions of the Copenhagen criteria (and subsequently the
acquis communautaire), including economic, democratic and humanitarian
reforms (Nugent, 2010, p. 43). The EU’s strategy was to implement a
rule transfer scheme in order to elevate the candidate countries to
Western-European standard so that their new membership wouldn’t have a
negative impact on the EU’s prosperity.
In Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier’s article they offer three different
models of the EU’s external governance on CEEC’s rule adoption and
analyze their effectiveness in implementing EU legislation into
domestic law: ‘The social learning model’, ‘the lesson-drawing model’
and ‘the external incentives model’, which seemed to be applied the
most. The logic behind the ‘the external incentives model’ was to
uses carrots and sticks as conditions to further accession.
Overall the rule transfer proved rather context-dependent. The
democratic conditionality turned out to be least effective, as none of
the three modes contributed to that area, especially for the most
nationalist and authoritarian states. This can be explained by the
fact that democratic reforms threatened the power position of the
political elite which found the adoption cost to be too high
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 10). Of the three models ‘the
external incentive model’ seemed most effective in regards to the
acquis conditionality, especially when applied with a credible
membership perspective. Also the acquis conditionality did not
interfere as much with domestic power politics as the democratization did.
The social learning and lesson drawing models explained economic
reforms and environmental issues in some cases as those rules had
been implemented before the EU set the bar. This was also the case
with Hungary and Poland as they had started working on minority
protection as soon as the Soviet Union seized to exist. Also, in
regards to those alternative models ‘the presence or absence of
epistemic communities promoting EU rules emerges as a key factor’
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 13). The external incentives
model is a rather rational approach to the integration process of the
CEEC countries. It rests on various factors but they conclude that the
effectiveness of rule transfer rests primarily on the willingness of
the third country to join the union. All of the CEEC countries
expressed their will to join the EU as soon as the iron curtain fell
(Nugent, 2010, p. 47). With that fact in mind, and also because they
had nowhere else to go, the EU was in full control of negotiations
with an strong bargaining position capable of offering rewards hard to
resist. This can lead to a seemingly coercive rule transfer, which
might prove ineffective in the long run as the rules for the
enlargement acquis where designed for accession candidates and not
binding for full members (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 16).
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier found evidence implying that ‘[r]ules
that are transferred through social learning or lesson-drawing are
much less contested domestically (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004,
p. 14). Concluding that if the CEE countries where conditioned,
instead of persuaded, to accept external governance through
cost-benefit analysis they might reverse some, or even all, of the
reforms as soon as membership is insured. In other words, the carrot
and stick strategy only works while the carrot hangs on the
string. They also noted that some member states and parts of the
Commission ‘indicated that rather superficial alignment would not
present an obstacle to concluding negotiations in the areas of EU
social policy’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 13).
Minority rights and autonomy
In order to understand Will Kymlicka’s point of view we must look in
to his philosophical premise. As a political philosopher his work has
to a large extent revolved around the ontological misunderstanding of
western individualism as a building block of human
society. Rational/liberal individualism can be traced back to the
political analysis of the enlightenment from
state-of-nature-theorists and philosophers such as David Hume, John
Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Although not fully
compatible theorists they share a fundamental ontological view of the
individual as a rational being, forming a societal realm of
governance. Kymlicka fears that by accepting the ontological view of
a ‘bottom up’ social structure, it will lead to a normative
homogeneity and injustices towards national minorities and indigenous
people. He argues that individuals form identities through interaction
with their socially constructed reality, indicating a ‘bottom up/top
down’ ontology. Liberal western individualism in fact assumes one
world view, cosmopolitanism, which denies those who wish to define
their individuality from their national culture from leading a
meaningful life. As an attempt to prevent the injustice of
homogenising nation states Kymlicka suggests a diffusing of liberal
multicultural models of the state and citizenship through
International organizations (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 307).
In his view, institutionalizing minority rights is of the outmost
importance and the key to a stabilized Europe once the CEEC’s join the
EU. The solution rests not only in institutionalizing minority rights
on the basis of the UN’s declaration of ‘generic minority rights’
which applies to all ethnocultural minorities, but through ‘targeted
rights’. ‘Targeted rights’ apply to particular types of minorities
‘such as indigenous peoples, national minorities, immigrants, the
Roma/gypsies, and so on’ (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 199). Kymlicka claims
that the initial drive for the EU’s initial 1990 OSCE Copenhagen
Declaration was a ‘complex mixture of humanitarian, self interested,
and ideological, reasons’ (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 174). The declaration
strongly supported minority rights and endorsed territorial autonomy
for national minorities. Following the declaration Kymlicka identifies
three strategies formulated by the EU to help improve state-minority
relations: ‘Publicizing best practices’; ‘formulating minimum
standard’; and ‘case specific interventions’. All of the three tracks
failed miserably according to Kymlicka. The best practices strategy,
designed to introduce previously successful western models of
minority-majority relations, simply failed to convey the message for
the epistemic community completely overlooked the underlying cultural
difference between eastern and western Europe. When confronted with
the problem in the west, most of the humanitarian norms we take for
granted already existed.
By formulating minimum standards, and this brings us to
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier and the external incentive model, the
EU made a number of tremendous mistakes leading to the abandonment of
useful multicultural norms. In 1993 all of the major European
organizations had developed a consensus to establish minimum norms and
standards of minority groups, and they all endorsed territorial
autonomy. The problem was that no one seemed to have a clear idea what
these standards should be or how to formulate them. Again the
epistemic community failed as the short timeframe resulted in norms
with serious limitations (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 199). Another critical
issue regarding minimum standards and probably the main reason for the
failure of the whole experiment was the fact that these minimum
standards were off course intended to apply to all member states of
the EU. But as it turned out, the current member states could not
abide to that. ‘While they were willing to insist that the
post-communist states be monitored for their treatment of minorities,
Western democracies did not want their own treatment of national
minorities examined (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 210). By resisting their own
norm diffusion the western part of the EU self-destructed further
progress leading to the diffusion of minority self-government. As the
post-communist countries strongly opposed all ideas in that matter,
based on security reasons, the idea was dropped and subsequently all
efforts to promote something like liberal multiculturalism disappeared
(Kymlicka, 2007, p. 211). The case specific interventions according to
Kymlicka are misleading and rest on the logic of security instead of
multiculturalism. Conflict prevention may turn out effective but it
results in a double-standard-dilemma as the actions taken by the EU
‘have demonstrated their preparedness to follow any policy measure to
create stability’ (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 233). Kymlicka concludes by
saying that it has become the norm to deal with minority issues in the
post-communist states by calculating actions about how to restore
security. In his view the CEEC integration process opened a window for
implementing a liberal-multicultural norm for all of Europe, ‘but the
window has gradually closed, with the job only half-done (Kymlicka,
2007, p. 315).
Conclusion
Even though Kymlica’s analysis rested on a much narrower viewpoint his
conclusions are consistent with the findings of Schimmelfenning and
Sedelmeier, which underlines the contextual momentum of state-minority
relations in the CEEC/EU relationship.
This case is extremely complicated. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier
note that even though the integration of the CEEC can be explained
initially through a shared European identity, the EU approached the
accession through a fair share of what is commonly called old
governance (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 16). The accession
meetings had the aura of an old fashion, top down hegemonies where the
EU explained what needed to be reformed, how it should be done and
what the prize was in return. It’s obvious that the EU made a mistake
in going in to the accession negotiations with a “one size fits all”
rule transfer model thus failing to diffuse important humanitarian
norms such as minority rights and sustaining democratic reforms. I
find that the methodology of the rule transfer applied by the EU to be
rational and that the actors on both sides performed as
utility-maximizers as the CEE countries where subjected to substantial
external governance. As the case progressed I noted a tendency of self
interests from member states coherent with
rational choice institutionalism,
but not
liberal institutionalism,
for I found that the states acknowledged the institutional
framework. In the case of member states accepting superficial
alignment to the acquis it indicates a lack of commitment on behalf
of the EU, and I wonder why. Perhaps they were hoping for the
superficial alignment to spill over into a more determent domestic reforms.
In my view the EU overestimated the kinship of the formerly divided
continent, hurling the accession negotiation it to a setting of ‘old
politics’ and because of the strong institutional ‘path dependency’
within the EU framework they lost control of the process.
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comments
Rúnar Berg says
It is interesting to ask why Icelanders don’t think of them self (generally) as indigenous, but Polynesians do. Same goes with why Norwegian white folks don’t while Norwegian Saamis do. I’m going to suggest that this indigenous identification is somewhat triggered by being colonized. But even then it’s not so simple, because Greenland and Iceland were colonized by the same world power, yet Greenlanders consider themselves indigenous but not Icelanders. Perhaps it has something to do with the nature of colonization. While Denmark took the governance of Iceland in their own hands, they took the culture of Greenland and tried to make it theirs. Iceland has the luxury of sharing a large part of their colonial powers, hence they hardly lost any of their culture. In Greenland that is a different story. Now we can see that the white culture in Norway has emerged as the dominant one, hence white Norwegians are not indigenous, but the Saami Norwegians are.
Of course, this is a vast oversimplification. But it gives us a lot to think about.
John says
Well, obviously its a matter of being white or not.